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Elections are a media spectacle (Kellner, 2009). Political parties, leaders and key figures, can 
reach a broad mass of voters via television and newspapers and so design communication to 
appeal to media organisations’ logic, producing media friendly images and text and 
performing for the cameras through a series of pseudo-events (Stromback & Nord, 2006). 
The numerous policy launches, battle bus tours and visits to hospitals are all designed to 
capture evening television news headlines and the front pages of the next day’s newspapers. 
However, while media have a mass audience they do not offer a direct channel from 
campaign to citizen. The accompanying editorial text is beyond the control of the spin 
doctors who may help writing the words spoken by the politician but ensuring these are 
disseminated unchallenged is impossible, and for some parties it proves a greater challenge 
than for others.  Hence media management is an important campaigning function, although 
one largely ignored within political marketing literature (for an exception see Savigny & 
Temple, 2010). This omission is somewhat bizarre given that in a political context the brand 
image, values and messages tend to mostly be translated to the wider audience via television 
and the press (Shehata & Strömbäck, 2014). This chapter focuses on the relative importance 
of the leader debates and interviews, the impartial television news and the partisan print 
media and explores the role mass media played in shaping and translating the marketing 
strategies of the parties and their leaders into news items for public consumption. The data 
presented allows us to draw some conclusions as to the relative successes of the various 
parties’ media management strategies. 
 
The role of political public relations 
Media management, often referred to as spinning, has evolved significantly from being the 
relatively simple task of ensuring that the organisation gains public recognition through 
appearing in media (Botan & Trowbridge, 2015: 357-377). Political parties cannot simply 
rely on a reactive strategy, assuming their innate newsworthiness. Rather they have to be 
proactive and strategic (Negrine & Lilleker, 2002). Thus a 21st century media management 
strategy involves crafting text for press releases, speeches and comments, and events at which 
speeches or more often soundbites and photo opportunities are delivered in order to ensure 
these appear in the headlines. Party campaigns must also recognise the various ways in which 
media publish news, via online and 24/7 channels, via bulletins and updates and when content 
is determined for the main news bulletins and front pages. Social media has also brought new 
ways of interacting with journalists, allowing for public complaints, praise and reactions to 
the work of journalists alongside the traditionally private phone calls and emails. The 
challenges posed by the hypermedia age (Howard, 2006) are manifold and for campaign 
media managers to ensure that media coverage conveys positive brand information, painting 
the party and key individuals in the most positive light, is extremely difficult.  
The professionalization of political campaigning has seen political organisations adapting and 
evolving their communication strategies to maximise impact (Negrine & Lilleker, 2002). 
Communications consultants, from advertising, public relations and journalism, have given 
senior management functions during elections (Gibson & Rommele, 2009) with the function 
of the . spin doctor being crucial for getting the party message to a critical mass of the 
electorate. The power dynamics between journalist and spin doctor are complicated, with 
both journalists and spin doctors being the more powerful at different times and in different 
places (Meyen et al, 2014). 
The most sophisticated campaigns will be planned carefully, soundbites will be crafted and 
all party representatives will be encouraged to repeat these on news items, press releases, 
leaflets, e-newsletters, weblogs and social media posts as well as on the doorsteps they do 
visit across the UK constituencies. Parties will also have a rapid rebuttal unit to respond 
instantly to criticisms. The extent to which these elements are evidenced through gaining 
positive coverage determines the success of a party media management strategy. 
 
Party media priorities 
Data from a survey conducted as part of a pan-European study of campaign professionalism 
(Tenscher et al, 2015), which asked party campaign strategists to rank items one to five on 
their importance, demonstrates the strategic thinking within the major UK parties. The data is 
limited as Plaid Cymru did not respond but represents the top three parties, two other national 
competitors and the SNP who had significant impact upon the campaign and its outcome. 
Cumulatively the data shows that media management is a key priority within party 
campaigning. In terms of central planning we see a gulf between the three major 
parliamentary parties and the minor parties, UKIP and the Greens. As the SNP campaign only 
in Scotland and so have a smaller electorate central planning may be simpler regardless. 
Aside from the Greens and UKIP, parties see external consultants such as spin doctors as 
having a crucial role in designing the campaign. 
 
Table 6.1 here 
 
While there are disparities in media analysis, involving measuring coverage and sentiment as 
well as ensuring rapid rebuttal, all parties agree on the importance of having impact on the 
media agenda, with five out of the six parties giving it the highest priority. Similarly 
appearances on national television are the most important form of media appearance, far 
outweighing free and paid advertising; differences are likely to reflect the chances of party 
leaders appearing on television. For example, the Greens rarely gain news coverage so see 
their television spots as of great importance. Strategically, however, parties concentrate on 
being in the news, whether that is in the press or on television, and prize being on television. 
The universal importance given to influencing the media agenda suggests that during a 
general election campaign spin doctors will work behind the scenes to get journalists ‘on 
side’ as well as providing a rich array of imagery and text designed to be instantly usable for 
news production.  
 
Carefully and cautiously: party media management strategies 
Key to impacting the media agenda is gaining positive coverage and for a party’s key 
campaign messages to feature in media coverage, any news is good news and even when 
challenged or criticised there are opportunities to gain awareness and support. The campaign 
was essentially one of competing visions, therefore two opposing sets of messages competed 
for media attention and reportage. The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats focused on their 
achievements in stabilising the economy, the latter arguing austerity would have proved 
harsher without the Liberal Democrat presence in government. The Conservatives, steered by 
Lynton Crosby, played on fears of a further economic collapse if they were ousted from 
office. In an attempt to counter the Conservative message that they could not be trusted with 
the economy Labour attempted to offer austerity-lite, reducing the national debt but without 
penalising poorer citizens, the accusation levelled at the coalition government, and raising 
fears over the future of the NHS. To undermine Labour’s challenge the Conservatives 
emphasised the dangers of a Labour-SNP coalition, demonstrating how parties can change 
messages in response to feedback on how they are working, and when they it is crucial their 
spin doctors persuade the media to accept the new terms of reference as the way to cover the 
election. The other parties argued against austerity measures, with UKIP emphasising its anti-
EU, anti-immigration message. While this might appear as two camps both were extremely 
divided and each party sought to promote greater differentiation than similarity in their 
positions. 
It perhaps reflects the slightly lower prioritisation by the Conservatives of appearing on the 
media as well as the general caution evidenced across the campaign, that setting up the leader 
debates involved protracted negotiations. In the end there were two debates, the first 
involving all the main contenders: Conservative Cameron, Labour’s Miliband, Liberal 
Democrat Clegg, UKIP’s Farage, Bennett of the Green party and Sturgeon and Wood 
representing the Scottish and Welsh Nationalists respectively; the second debate featured the 
challengers, excluding David Cameron and Nick Clegg. The build-up was probably hyped 
more than the events themselves gained coverage. The winners, in terms of gaining popular 
coverage, were Nicola Sturgeon and Leanne Wood. The debates provided them with a 
platform to talk to the whole nation. Miliband, arguably, was the loser. As the heir apparent 
or potential kingmaker given the proximity in opinion polls between Labour and the 
Conservatives, he faced attacks from the other party leaders particularly as he had rejected 
discussion of which party he might form a coalition with after outright rejecting a Labour-
SNP alliance. Following the first debate it appeared the media agreed  Sturgeon emerged the 
winner, although UKIP leader Nigel Farage’s controversial statements across the debates 
would have appealed to his core vote. One subsequent ‘debate’ involved the main party 
leaders appearing separately responding to audience questions. Miliband’s claim that the 
1997-2010 Labour governments did not overspend was responded to with audible disquiet 
from the audience, countering his better than expected earlier performances and putting 
Labour’s campaign on the back foot.  
The rest of the campaign involved party leaders touring the target seats, providing a series of 
the visual opportunities for the press pack, though it is questionable whether such visits 
achieve anything beyond generating coverage (Middleton, 2015). Carefully planned events 
were held in empty warehouses and closed car parks where the public were unable to ambush 
the campaign but the party faithful could be assembled to provide the impression of 
accessibility (Wring & Ward, 2015). Conservative gaffes were minor; Cameron’s noteworthy 
mistake was appearing to forget which football team he supported. Labour tried a variety of 
stunts, including Miliband appearing with Russel Brand for his Trews YouTube channel and 
the appearance of his promises carved in stone. Both received much criticism; the latter went 
from being the ‘Edstone’ to Miliband’s ‘Headstone’ on Twitter in a matter of hours. These 
were in many ways the stand out events of the campaign reflecting the safety first approach 
that Labour only diverted from in the last days. 
In order to explore how the media covered the election we draw on Loughborough University 
data who count instances where topics and issues are covered in news. Their data shows that 
the news agenda focused largely on the differing coalition opportunities both leaders might 
have to entertain, with television and press devoting 45.9% and 44.5% of election coverage 
respectively to what media scholars refer to as the process of the election (Deacon et al, 
2015). The second most prominent topic was the economy (8.1% on television, 10.5% in 
press). The NHS, Labour’s flagship topic, was the sixth most mentioned policy area on 
television, fifth in the press with an average of 3.6% of coverage. Thus Labour’s strategy for 
influencing the news agenda appeared to have proved an abject failure. Equally, as we shall 
see, Labour’s television appearances and attempts to gain publicity outside of the much 
hyped debate-style programmes largely led to negative coverage suggesting the partisan 
media deliberately controlled the agenda as opinion polls are pointed to a very close election 
to influence the outcome. For the other parties is was not so much a hostile media as one that 
exhibited disinterest. 
 
A question of imbalance 
The imbalance in attention to and treatment given to the party leaders draws further on data 
gathered by Loughborough University Communication Research Centre, here focusing on 
mentions of the parties and their leaders as well as testing for balance in positive and negative 
coverage across the media. These data show a stark imbalance which consistently favoured 
Cameron and the Conservatives and, in particular, undermined Miliband and Labour. It 
would seem fair to suggest that the media, and in particular the press, set out to ensure a 
majority Conservative government would be elected. The Loughborough researchers 
analysed all coverage 30th March to 7 May from television news bulletins (Channel 4 News 
(7pm), Channel 5 News (6.30pm), BBC1 News at 10, ITV1 News at 10, BBC2 Newsnight, 
Sky News 8-8pm) and from a spectrum of press outlets (The Guardian, Independent, Times, 
Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Mirror, Sun, Star and Metro). 
In terms of exposure, television news offered reasonable balance in quoting parties and 
leaders. The Conservatives gained 30.14%, Cameron 10.48%; Labour 27.98%, Miliband 
9.85%; and Liberal Democrats 17.22%, Clegg 8.21% broadly reflecting their standing at the 
2010 election; other parties received less coverage with the SNP the next most quoted party 
and leader Nicola Sturgeon gaining well over half the coverage and 5.74 overall. The 
imbalance is most visible in the press, Conservatives gaining 44.48%, Cameron 21.95%; 
Labour 29%, Miliband 13.09%; Liberal Democrats 11.89%, Clegg 8.5%; the SNP lost out to 
UKIP whose leader, Nigel Farage gained 8.22% of press quotes almost equalling Clegg. In 
terms of overall appearances in media however, Labour gained 28.7% appearances on 
television to the Conservatives 27.9%; The Lib Dems lagged on 15.1%, the SNP on 11.1% 
and UKIP on 9.7%. Press coverage is as imbalanced for mentions as quotations, the 
Conservatives gained 37.5% of coverage, Labour 31.8%, the Lib Dems 10%, SNP 9% and 
UKIP 8.3%.  
The imbalance in press reporting did not simply concern mentions or quotes however. Across 
the period of the campaign, when assessing coverage for clear bias on the part of the 
journalist, the Conservatives gained an average 0.15 positivity score. Labour in contrast 
average a 0.20 negative score, and although all other parties gain an overall negative average 
the consistent attacks on Labour are rivalled only by those against the SNP. The SNP 
received more attacks as the campaign progressed but still only gained a 0.11 negative 
average for the final week. The anti-SNP narrative originated in Conservative advertisements 
depicting Labour leader Ed Miliband being the puppet of Alex Salmond, SNP leader in the 
House of Commons, or in the pocket of Nicola Sturgeon, SNP leader. The perspective of 
Miliband as weak meant that this fear may have been seen as a reality by many and also 
played into a further discourse around who governs and what influence the SNP or indeed 
Scottish MPs in general should have within Westminster.  
Of course there were differences by outlet, the Daily Mirror for example promoted the 
Labour line and consistently encouraged their readers to fear a Conservative majority. But the 
Mirror, and fellow left-wing newspaper The Guardian, were minority voices and likely 
talking to the converted anyway. The bias, however, also reflects Miliband’s strategy for 
reaching out to supportive outlets as opposed to attempting to court Murdoch and the Sun as 
Blair had. Yet we should recognise the difficulties in this. While many media outlets 
recognised Clegg had won public support following the first leaders’ debate in 2010 this was 
followed by a raft of Conservative inspired negative stories. Therefore Miliband’s vacillation 
in dealing with the hostile press may be understandable. Regardless of potential Labour 
strategic failures, for the majority who read newspapers, and in particular the three million 
regular readers of the Sun or Mail, there was a consistent diet of pro-Conservative and anti-
Labour propaganda which led veteran leftist journalist Roy Greenslade to tell readers of his 
Guardian editorial “the relentless ridicule over the six-week campaign may have played some 
part in the voting decisions of floating voters” (Greenslade, 2015). 
The imbalance in the press was countered by balance across the broadcasters; however 
Miliband’s failure to emerge triumphant from any of the debates maintained a perspective of 
Labour and Miliband as unfit to govern. Miliband’s average performances were compounded 
when he made the news for leaving his crib sheet for the first debate in the dressing room 
revealing his strategy to appear as a ‘happy warrior’. While having a strategic persona 
schematic is not surprising, revealing the details gives the impression of fakery. Arguably 
Miliband also emerged undermined from the solo interview with the BBC’s veteran 
antagonist Jeremy Paxman. While Miliband’s ‘Hell Yes!’ response to Paxman’s question of 
are you ready to lead the country was intended to give the impression of credibility, Paxman 
audibly asking Miliband ‘are you alright?’ after the 30 minute grilling may have given the 
audience the impression Paxman saw him as unable to take the pressure.  
 
Therefore, overall we find a media interested in their own agenda, which parties might form a 
coalition being a dominant theme, driven by polls that showed no difference between the 
parties, and so obsessing with predictions and speculation. Beneath the narrative was  that 
Miliband and Labour were not up to the job of governance, this emerged fleetingly on 
television broadcasts but was  the core message disseminated by those newspapers which 
might be termed once again the ‘Tory Press’. Essentially the Conservatives and David 
Cameron were triumphant in marketing themselves via the media, Labour in contrast abjectly 
failed in this respect. If we accept the findings from research that claim the UK electorate are 
most likely to gain political information from the mainstream media and if we believe that the 
media is able to influence voter attitudes towards the parties, their leaders, the leaders’ 
credibility, and the likelihood of their policies being implemented or having the suggested 




Market failure or Marketing failure 
The question that must be posed is whether Conservative dominance can be attributed to an 
effective strategy or latent media bias and, if the answer is equivocal, to what extent the 
responsibility for Conservative success can be attributed to either. The Conservatives had 
significant advantages. There was evidence their economic strategy was having a positive 
impact and theirs was a relatively gaffe free campaign performance, so it was an easy and 
skilfully executed sell. Parties wishing to offer austerity-lite, Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats, were bound to struggle with message clarity and so required greater resources 
devoted to media management. The anti-austerity message was clear, though highly 
contestable and seemingly out of step with a broader majority of ‘average’ voters. The 
Conservatives therefore appeared to have the right message, one that resonating with 
journalists and voters and so had an open door via the media. 
But, one cannot negate the alternative perspective that independent of the political context the 
innate Conservative bias would have been visible. Cameron’s links to the Murdoch empire 
are manifold and personal, so those outlets would be expected to demonstrate a bias. The bias 
might be even more pronounced following criticisms made publicly of Murdoch by Miliband 
as well as prominent Liberal Democrats. The anti-Labour narrative was also not simply a 
feature of the election campaign. Since his election as Labour leader, Ed Miliband allowed 
himself to be characterised as the man who stabbed his brother in the back to assume the 
leadership. A long term more negative association was made with the Trade Unions, who 
assured his victory and led Miliband being given the moniker of ‘Red Ed’. Miliband was also 
depicted as odd looking, with pictures of his contorted expressions while donating to the 
homeless, eating a bacon sandwich or listening to a fellow panellist on Loose Women 
circulated via mainstream media and online. These images, and his similarity in looks to 
Wallace, the plasticene character in Nick Park’s animated films, have been regular fodder for 
satirical television programmes such as Have I Got New For You and cumulatively led to a 
tarnished brand. The satisfaction rating for Miliband’s performance as leader have always 
lagged behind that of Cameron, the surprising aspect of the polls is that Miliband’s 
performance was not mirrored in declared party support. To what extent the media were 
reflecting the failure of Labour and Miliband to present an alternative image, or their political 
bias against Miliband’s Labour is a moot point. 
Arguably it would seem to be a combination of anti-Miliband and anti-Labour media bias, 
compounded by having a leader who provided significant ammunition to his opponents. In 
contrast Cameron maintained a steady course to emerge as the better man for the job. 
Miliband’s core team appeared to be constituted of media consultants with expertise in print 
media, though there was no attempt to redress the imbalance in the press. However the lack 
of television expertise was criticised by some close to the party for not doing more to court 
television journalists and gain better coverage. Yet, when considering media bias one has to 
remark that the Liberal Democrats got no easier time and were either positioned as radicals 
within the coalition or an irrelevance with the issue of broken promises over student tuition 
fees becoming Clegg’s political millstone. The press appeared to be against the idea of a 
coalition and keen to rid themselves of the junior partner, therefore perhaps political bias 
explains as much or more of the coverage than purely Miliband’s communication failures. 
 
Media effects 
If the media provide all or even a majority of the information stored in the memories of 
voters which will be accessed when required to make a decision then it is likely that the 
majority of associations relating to Ed Miliband and Labour were negative. At least in part, 
this represents a failure of Labour media management strategy. However, as a counter to this 
one can also argue that, when recognising Labour were not alone in receiving largely 
negative coverage, the balance of coverage demonstrates the success of Conservative party 
spin doctors, and the party’s relationships with key outlets and their owners, from Cameron 
becoming party leader over the course of the coalition government. The dominance of the 
party led to their coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, to fail to be able to move beyond 
the perception of them as having reneged on their election promises in order to build a 
coalition agreement, Labour and Miliband to face repeated attacks, and to the marginalisation 
of other parties. The extent to which a party was visible to the audience or not in the media, 
and whether any positive coverage was received, depended on which specific outlet a citizen 
relied upon for political news of course. However, for the average person with a low interest 
in politics who might seek cues as how to cast their vote then the cue provided by the press in 
particular but also some key aspects of television news coverage was to vote Conservative. 
But how do we explain this with reference to media effect theory and media management 
strategy? 
Agenda setting is a key function of any media management strategy and involves being able 
to influence what topics appear in the headlines (Hopman et al, 2012). Labour’s strategy was 
to shift focus from the economy onto the NHS, a policy area which is safe Labour territory. 
However, it was the Conservative agenda that dominated headlines. Throughout the coalition 
period, from revealing Labour junior minister Liam Byrnes had left a note for his predecessor 
reading “I’m afraid there is no money” the Conservative’s focused on promoting themselves 
as the party of fiscal responsibility; Labour were dubbed irresponsible and so to blame for the 
UK’s economic collapse. The note became a feature of the campaign as a reminder of the 
Conservative’s narrative, juxtaposed with regular reports of positive economic news kept 
public focus on the economy. Byrne himself admitted that his ‘joke’ had been hugely 
damaging for Labour’s chances in 2015 (Helm, 2015).  
The framing of the recession, as Labour’s fault, began prior to the 2010 contest and arguably 
was already in the public consciousness. Framing refers to the way in which an event or issue 
is defined, according to linguistic scholars it is a rhetorical construction of reality (Foss & 
Foss, 2011). While there were competing frames, particularly the frame promoted by Labour 
that it was a global phenomenon and beyond the control of any nation, it would appear the 
Conservative frame became the most accepted version of events fairly early (ICM, 2008). 
Labour were unable to contest this frame effectively, or contest the subsequent framing of 
austerity as necessary. Labour’s failure also hindered the challenge made by other parties to 
the Conservative position.  
Perhaps the biggest problem that was faced in challenging the Conservative hegemony over 
the agenda, or the dominance of the Conservatives in controlling the media, was in gaining a 
positive image for party leaders Miliband and Clegg. While the hypodermic needle effect, 
where a perception is repeated by media and subconsciously accepted by their audiences, is 
largely discredited, arguably the media portrayal of groups through negative stereotypes can 
lead to increased levels of prejudice (Scharrer & Ramasubramanian, 2015). Media literacy 
and education are intervening variables, however when considering many may be media 
dependent for their understanding of politics and due to low interest pick up simplistic cues to 
differentiate between parties and their leaders one might expect to find low levels of literacy 
and interest in relation to media reporting of politics and so higher levels of media influence 
over attitudes. Therefore it may be possible to reconsider the importance of the hypodermic 
needle media effect in the context of political communication.  
The long term portrayal of Ed Miliband as of the left, under Trade Union control as well as 
uncharismatic was used to undermine his credibility as a potential prime minister. Similarly 
the ‘broken promises’ narrative that became associated with Nick Clegg is likely to have been 
responsible for the dramatic collapse in Liberal Democrat support. Without rolling panel 
studies it is impossible to determine whether the drip feed of negative images and stories led 
to negative public attitudes being developed and maintained. However, the election winners, 
the Conservatives and leader David Cameron, enjoyed a more positive media spotlight and so 
negative associations must have been far lower.   
 
Conclusions 
The press were largely pro-Conservative and anti-Labour. The BBC were balanced in their 
overall coverage levels but at points were equally responsible for undermining Miliband if 
not promoting Cameron or the Conservatives. BBC documentaries also exposed racists 
within UKIP and raised questions regarding the SNP’s agenda, suggesting at worst a support 
for a political status quo. While these exposes were outside of mainstream news coverage, 
one can enquire to what extent BBC News programming also exhibited bias.  
 
The question for media management is, if the media are against you how can a party counter 
this and earn more positive coverage? Given that a minority use non-traditional news sources 
for political information, circumnavigating the media and relying on the Internet and social 
media is not a logical response. The lack of overt bias in television news provides some scope 
for attempting to influence the agenda, though that scope is limited when balance is 
paramount. The press and voters usually have firm attitudes at the start of a campaign, and 
those tend not to change, therefore any efforts within the specific campaign period might be 
wasted. 
Media management therefore must be a long term process. Cameron’s team set about framing 
the economic crisis positively for the Conservatives in 2008, at the 2010 contest there was no 
need to try to influence the media agenda, the focus was on the economy regardless, but 
rather to ensure the media accepted the Conservative framing of the crisis and attribution of 
blame. The extent to which this influenced the outcome of the 2010 election is of course 
debatable, particularly given that either the Conservatives or Labour could, in theory, have 
formed a coalition government. Miliband’s election as Labour leader saw minor 
improvements in economic forecasts allowing the Conservatives to position themselves as 
competent managers. Miliband, in contrast, was positioned as Cameron’s non-telegenic, 
awkward and ultimately unelectable opponent. The extent to which there were behind the 
scenes briefing to sympathetic journalists by Conservative spin doctors in unknown with any 
certainty, though this is argued to be common practice (MacBride, 2015), but both Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats were painted in a negative light over the course of the coalition 
government. The election involved only reinforcing those negatives, and the negative aspect 
of the Conservative communication strategy was sufficiently effective to counter any Labour 
resurgence. Alternative frames of a potential coalition were not considered, only the danger 
of the SNP controlling Miliband’s Labour; alternative perspectives of Miliband were rarely 
offered; Clegg was largely marginalised. A favourable press gave Cameron’s Conservatives a 
direct link with their audiences, branding his party as competent managers. Perhaps the 
election result demonstrates the importance of the media, having the media on side, and 
having a sound and long-term media management strategy. Arguably if the media is against a 
party, any party branding strategy is sure to be blown off course, the question is was it just 
too easy to undermine Labour?  
